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Abstract—We consider the problem of secure distributed ma-
trix computation (SDMC), where a user can query a function of
data matrices generated at distributed source nodes. We assume
the availability of N honest but curious computation servers,
which are connected to the sources, the user, and each other
through orthogonal and reliable communication links. Our goal is
to minimize the amount of data that must be transmitted from the
sources to the servers, called the upload cost, while guaranteeing
that no T colluding servers can learn any information about the
source matrices, and the user cannot learn any information be-
yond the computation result. We first focus on secure distributed
matrix multiplication (SDMM), considering two matrices, and
propose a novel polynomial coding scheme using the properties of
finite field discrete Fourier transform, which achieves an upload
cost significantly lower than the existing results in the literature.
We then generalize the proposed scheme to include straggler
mitigation, as well as to the multiplication of multiple matrices
while keeping the input matrices, the intermediate computation
results, as well as the final result secure against any T colluding
servers. We also consider a special case, called computation with
own data, where the data matrices used for computation belong
to the user. In this case, we drop the security requirement against
the user, and show that the proposed scheme achieves the minimal
upload cost. We then propose methods for performing other
common matrix computations securely on distributed servers,
including changing the parameters of secret sharing, matrix
transpose, matrix exponentiation, solving a linear system, and
matrix inversion, which are then used to show how arbitrary
matrix polynomials can be computed securely on distributed
servers using the proposed procedure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, performing computationally intensive
operations locally on a single machine is infeasible, and
clients often rely on powerful cloud servers for demanding
computations. In the so-called serverless computing paradigm,
clients can request computationally expensive tasks to be
performed on massive datasets, potentially generated at mul-
tiple geographically distributed locations, using special pur-
pose computing servers (eg., Amazon Web Services (AWS),
Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud). While serverless computing
provides significant flexibility and speed up, it also leads to
growing data privacy concerns, as the corporations that provide
computation services also provide many other digital services,
and have access to unprecedented amounts of private user
data. Therefore, algorithms that would allow users to benefit
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from powerful untrustworthy servers while keeping their data
private are of significant interest. Our goal in this paper is to
design efficient secure distributed matrix computation (SDMC)
algorithms, which keep data private from the potentially col-
luding computing servers as well as the entities requesting the
computations.
We consider Γ ≥ 1 data sources, represented as matrices
A(1), . . . ,A(Γ) on an appropriate finite field. A user requests
to compute a function of these matrices, G(A(1), . . . ,A(Γ)),
with the help of N computing servers. All of the sources are
connected to the servers, and all the servers are connected
to each other, with orthogonal and reliable links. Similarly,
computations carried out by the servers are conveyed to the
user over orthogonal and reliable links. For a given number of
N servers, our goal will be to minimize the amount of data that
must be uploaded from the sources to the servers, which we
refer to as the upload cost. The upload cost often determines
the financial cost of serverless computing, but minimizing it
would also reduce the overall computing time as it limits
the amount of computations that must be carried out by the
servers, as well as the data delivery time from the sources
to the servers, which may be prohibitive especially when the
data sources are geographically distant from the servers. For
example, the source nodes may be geographically distributed
hospitals sharing medical data of patients, and the user may
be a research institute or a pharmaceutical company making
certain queries on the data. In addition to correct computation
of the request, we also want to guarantee the privacy of the
input data against the servers as well as the requesting user. We
impose information theoretic perfect privacy guarantees such
that any T colluding servers must not learn anything about
the data sources, or the user must not learn anything about the
data sources apart from the computation result. We assume
that all the servers are honest and responsive, but curious,
which means that they follow the prescribed protocol honestly,
but any T of them may collude to try to deduce information
about the input matrices. We will also consider the special
setting of computation with own data, in which case the user
wants to compute a function on its own data matrices using the
available computing servers. In this case we drop the privacy
requirement against the user, and the problem lends itself to
further optimization.
We will first focus on the secure distributed matrix multipli-
cation (SDMM) problem, which has received significant recent
interest. Large scale matrix multiplication is a fundamental
building block of matrix computations in many machine
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
03
97
2v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  8
 Ju
l 2
02
0
2learning, optimization, and signal processing algorithms. It
is also one of the most computationally intensive operations.
Moreover, it can be easily distributed across multiple servers
thanks to its inherently parallel structure. We will first consider
the multiplication of Γ = 2 matrices, which will allow us to
introduce the main ideas behind our design. We then extend
our analysis to the multiplication of multiple matrices, as
well as other fundamental operations which, when combined
with matrix multiplication, allow computation of arbitrary
polynomials of matrices.
A. Related Work
The cryptography community has extensively studied the
problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC), also known
as secure function evaluation, in which Alice and Bob, having
inputs x and y, respectively, want to compute a function
f(x, y) jointly, without any of them learning anything about
the other’s input either from the communication, or from
the result of the computation [1]. The SDMM problem is
related to MPC yet different; the design has to ensure that
no computing server learns anything about the original data,
but we can decide which part of the data is revealed to each
server and in what form. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
is a class of cryptographic schemes that allow computations
on ciphertexts, generating an encrypted result which, when
decrypted, matches the result of the operations as if they
had been performed on plaintext. These techniques rely on
working over polynomial rings, and their security is based
on the assumed (or proven) hardness of problems in ideal
lattices [2], [3]. However, existing FHE schemes are slow and
impractical. “Somewhat homomorphic encryption” (SHE) has
been proposed as an alternative, which allows a limited number
of homomorphic operations on ciphertexts. SHE is relatively
faster, and ciphertext packing methods have been proposed
for operations like secure inner products [2], [4], and secure
matrix multiplications [3], which generalizes Yasuda et al.’s
packing method for inner products in [4]. Some works also
propose methods for performing other matrix computations
in an information theoretically secure manner, like Gaussian
elimination, matrix inversion, comparison, equality test, or
exponentiation [5], [6].
There is also a growing literature on distributed matrix
multiplication, where a lot of effort has been put into speeding
up computations, increasing reliability, and/or reducing com-
munication overhead using coding and communication theo-
retic ideas [7]–[13]. The initial papers considered a slightly
different context of speeding up parallel computations by
introducing “computation redundancy” to mitigate the problem
of straggling servers [7], [8]. Straggling servers refer to
slow/unresponsive servers due to which completion of the
computation is delayed. A standard way of dealing with strag-
glers is to introduce “computation redundancy”, that is, assign-
ing extra computations to each server. The common theme
in the ‘coded computation’ literature is to treat stragglers
as ‘erasures’ in communications, and apply ideas for coding
against erasures, which allows reliable reconstruction of the
desired result from an arbitrary set of successfully received
symbols. Reference [9] uses polynomial codes to construct a
scheme in which the computation is completed as long as any
K out of N evaluations of a polynomial are received from the
servers. To multiply two matrices A and B with the help of N
servers, the polynomial code in [9] partitions A row-wise and
B column-wise (row-by-column partitioning), and generates
encoded matrices as evaluations of a polynomial with the
blocks as the coefficients, similarly to Reed Solomon codes
[14]. In coded computation against stragglers, the performance
metric is the recovery threshold; that is, the minimum number
of successful (non-delayed, non-faulty) servers required for
completing the computation. A follow-up work [10] proposes
a new polynomial coded computation scheme called MatDot,
which achieves the optimal recovery threshold for column-
wise partitioning of matrix A and row-wise partitioning of
B (sum-of-outer-products method), which we shall refer to as
the column-by-row partitioning henceforth in the paper, at the
expense of an increase in the communication cost. In [10], the
authors also propose PolyDot codes that interpolate between
the polynomial codes of [9] and MatDot codes. PolyDot
codes are later improved to generalized PolyDot (GPD) codes
in [11], which achieve the optimal recovery threshold for
any arbitrary partitioning of the input matrices. Entangled
polynomial codes, proposed in parallel in [12], also achieve
the same performance as GPD codes. A bivariate polynomial
code is introduced in [15] for straggler mitigation.
Subsequent papers, inspired by the works on straggler
mitigation in distributed matrix multiplication, consider the
SDMM problem from an information theoretic perspective.
These papers aim for information theoretic security, inde-
pendent of the computational capacities of the attackers, as
opposed to cryptographic techniques. These works typically
assume that the data to be used for the computation is available
at the user, and hence the main concern is the privacy against
the servers. The earlier papers on SDMM consider download
rate as the performance metric, which is defined as the ratio of
the number of bits required to represent the computation result
to the total number of bits that the servers must transmit to the
user. Reference [16] uses the idea of polynomial codes from
the literature on straggler mitigation to propose an SDMM
scheme based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [17], which
is shown to achieve the optimal download rate for one-sided
SDMM (where only one of the matrices is kept secure). An
achievable scheme is also proposed for two-sided SDMM
(both matrices are kept secure). Reference [18] introduces
GASP codes, which improve the download rate for two-sided
SDMM by aligning the degrees of the terms in the polynomial
code so that the desired products appear as distinct terms.
In [19], new converse bounds on the optimal download rate
for SDMM are obtained by showing that the capacity of a
multi-message X-secure T-private information retrieval (MM-
XSTPIR) problem ( [20], [21]) provides an upper bound on the
download rate of the SDMM problem. The optimal download
rate of the MM-XSTPIR problem is shown to depend on the
dimensions of the matrices A and B. The scheme in [19]
allows the joint retrieval of a batch of matrix products (batch
multiplication), instead of multiplying two matrices using the
matrix partitioning approach, resulting in a coding gain.
3Reference [13] combines straggler mitigation and secure
computation using the batch multiplication approach. Byzan-
tine security is also considered, which refers to security against
adversarial servers that may actively corrupt the results they
send back to the user. Their scheme is based on Lagrange
polynomials, and it achieves the optimal recovery threshold
for any multi-linear function computation. Since the scheme in
[13] is designed for batch computation of any function, we can
adapt it for matrix multiplication using a matrix-partitioning
based approach, and compare its performance with that of
other matrix partitioning based schemes. This can be done
by treating the partitions of the matrices to be multiplied as
batches of data. Therefore, if A is partitioned column-wise and
B is partitioned row-wise into K partitions each, the scheme
in [13] has the recovery threshold of 2(K+T−1)+S+2A+1,
where S and A are the numbers of stragglers and Byzantine
adversaries, respectively. If A is partitioned row-wise and B is
partitioned column-wise, into K and L partitions respectively,
the recovery threshold is 2(KL + T − 1) + S + 2A + 1,
which is the same performance as that of the GASP codes
in [18] for big T , which can be seen by setting S = A = 0.
For arbitrary matrix partitions, the Lagrange coded scheme
does not perform as well as the secure generalized PolyDot
(SGPD) codes introduced later in [22]. In [22], the trade-off
between the download rate and the recovery threshold, first
studied in [23] using the MatDot and PolyDot schemes for
straggler mitigation, is extended to SDMM. The SGPD codes
achieve the same recovery threshold as Lagrange codes for the
sum-of-outer-products method.
In [24], the trade-off between the upload and download costs
for SDMM is studied. While the download cost is simply the
reciprocal of the download rate, the upload cost is defined as
the ratio of the total number of bits that the user must send
to the servers to the total size in bits of the data matrices. In
[24], a secure cross subspace alignment (SCSA) scheme with
adjustable upload cost (USCSA) is presented for SDMM. The
tradeoff between the upload and download costs for SDMM
schemes using only the row-by-column partitioning is studied
in [24], but not the tradeoff for SDMM schemes using the
column-by-row partitioning.
The work that is most related to ours is [25], which con-
siders the setting in which the data is generated at distributed
source nodes, and does not belong to the user requesting the
computation. It extends the BGW (Ben-Or, Goldwasser and
Widgerson) scheme from [26], which was first proposed in
the context of secure MPC, for multiplication of matrices
using a connected network of computing servers. The sources
are assumed not to be connected with each other, while the
servers are. The latter assumption is exploited to reduce the
communication to the user by allowing the servers to cooperate
securely. Thus, the servers share their results from the first
round of computation among each other using Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme, and compute a linear combination of the
received shares of the results. This inter-server cooperation
allows a smaller number of servers to send these linear
combinations to the user. This particular model also imposes
privacy against the user, that is, the user cannot learn anything
about the data beyond what it learns from the computation
result. This constraint is not imposed in other papers, where
the user is the source of the input data; and neither in [19],
where distributed source nodes generate the data.
B. Main contributions:
With respect to the rich literature on the topic that we have
summarized above, the main novel contributions of our work
can be summarized as follows:
• We first introduce a novel polynomial coding scheme
exploiting the properties of discrete Fourier transform,
and show that it achieves a near optimal upload cost
for SDMM of two matrices, while achieving the optimal
upload cost for the special case of computation with own
data, in which the user has access to the matrices used
in the computations.
• The proposed scheme can be implemented in an effi-
cient manner using the recently developed fast Fourier
transform (FFT) algorithm on finite fields [27], and has
negligible decoding complexity.
• We generalize the proposed scheme for SDMM of two
matrices to introduce straggler mitigation.
• We extend the proposed scheme to multiply multiple
matrices on distributed servers securely, while satisfying
the security constraints for keeping the intermediate and
final results secure against any T colluding servers. Our
scheme has a significantly lower upload cost than the ex-
isting schemes, and is naturally scalable to multiplication
of an arbitrary number of matrices.
• We describe secure distributed computation schemes for
other operations such as matrix addition, matrix trans-
pose, matrix exponentiation, changing the parameters
of the secret shares, and solving linear systems, which
includes computing the matrix inverse. Thus, it is shown
that arbitrary matrix polynomials can be computed se-
curely on distributed servers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider Γ source nodes, N ≥ 2 servers, and one
user, for some Γ, N ∈ N (see Fig. 1). Each source node is
connected to each server through an orthogonal link. Each
pair of servers is connected to each other, and each server
is connected to the user through a private link. Each source
node γ ∈ [Γ] , {1, . . . ,Γ} has access to an input matrix
A(γ) ∈ Fmγ×m
′
γ
q , for mγ ,m′γ ∈ N, γ ∈ [Γ], and a finite
field Fq with q elements. Using N computing servers, the
user wants to securely compute the result of a function
C = G(A(1), . . . ,A(Γ)), where G is an arbitrary polynomial
function, assuming appropriate matrix dimensions. We assume
that the entries of A(γ), γ ∈ [Γ], are independent of each other
and uniformly distributed over Fq . We also assume that the
servers are honest, but curious, which means that each server
honestly follows the protocol without spurious insertions, yet
may infer information about the inputs passively. Similarly
to [25], the system operates in three phases: (1) Sharing, (2)
Computation and communication, and (3) Reconstruction. A
detailed description of these phases is as follows.
41) Sharing phase: In this phase, the source γ sends
secret shares of matrix A(γ), denoted by [[A(γ)]]i,
to server i. [[A(γ)]]i is a function of input matrix
A(γ) and a secret key Sk(γ), and its dimensions will
depend on the scheme used.
2) Computation and communication: In this phase,
the servers process the data they have received from
the sources, and may also exchange messages with
each other. We denote the set of all messages that
server i sends to server i′ in this phase by Mi,i′ .
3) Reconstruction: In this phase, every server i ∈ [N ]
sends a message [[C]]i to the user, who decodes the
received messages to obtain the desired result of the
computation.
The scheme must satisfy the following four constraints.
a) Correctness: The user must be able to decode the
final function C = G(A(1), . . . ,A(Γ)) from all the responses
[[C]]1, . . . , [[C]]N . The correctness constraint is imposed by:
H
(
C
∣∣[[C]]1, . . . , [[C]]N) = 0. (1)
Remark 1. We will also consider the special case of compu-
tation with own data, where the data matrices used for com-
putation belong to the user, as in the distributed computation
scenario studied in [13], [16], [18], [22]. Accordingly, the
correctness constraint becomes:
H
(
C
∣∣[[C]]1, . . . , [[C]]N ,Sk(1), . . . ,Sk(Γ)) = 0. (2)
b) Security against the servers: The goal is to recover
C reliably and securely even if any T < N servers collude
to extract some information about the input matrices. Hence,
the encoded matrices [[A(γ)]]L, and the set of messages
communicated by the servers in Lc to the servers in L, denoted
by MLc,L, ∀L ⊆ [N ], |L| ≤ T, γ ∈ [Γ], must not reveal any
information about A(γ),∀γ ∈ [Γ]. Accordingly, the security
constraint is specified as,
I
({
A(γ)
}Γ
γ=1
;
{
[[A(γ)]]L
}Γ
γ=1
,MLc,L
)
= 0,
∀L ⊆ [N ], |L| ≤ T, ∀γ ∈ [Γ]. (3)
c) Security against the user: The user must not gain
additional information about the input matrices beyond the
result of the function G. This is defined as:
I
(
A(1), . . . ,A(Γ); [[C]]1, . . . , [[C]]N
∣∣C) = 0.
For a given number of servers N and security requirement
T , the performance will be measured in terms of the upload
cost from the source nodes to the servers. The upload cost is
defined as follows:
χUL ,
∑Γ
γ=1
∑N
i=1H([[A
(γ)]]i)∑Γ
γ=1H(A
(γ))
, (4)
and it quantifies the normalized amount of information that
must be delivered to the servers. In most cases the amount of
computation that must be carried out by each server depends
on the amount of information delivered to it, and many cloud
computing services charge users based on the amount of infor-
mation delivered and stored at each server. Hence, minimizing
User
A(1)Γ sources A(Γ)
1 2N servers N
[[A(1)]]1 [[A(1)]]2
[[A(1)]]N
[[A(Γ)]]1
[[A(Γ)]]2 [[A
(Γ)]]N
[[C]]1 [[C]]2 [[C]]N
Fig. 1. System model for Γ matrices with N servers, any T of which may
collude (shown as shaded servers).
the upload cost will reduce both the latency and the cost
of computations. Accordingly, our objective is to securely
compute C by incurring the minimum upload cost. Due to
the symmetry across the servers, we will assume (unless stated
otherwise) that the secret shares sent from each source to each
server is of the same size, and is a (1/K)th,K ∈ N, fraction
of the size of the input matrices.
Definition 1. An (N,K, T ) SDMC scheme uses N servers,
sends (1/K)th fraction of the input data matrices’ size to each
server, and is secure against any T colluding servers. Hence,
the upload cost of an (N,K, T ) SDMC scheme is given by
χUL =
N
K .
III. SDMM FOR Γ = 2
In this section we focus exclusively on the secure distributed
multiplication of two matrices, i.e., Γ = 2. This problem
will allow us to present the main ideas behind our coded
computation scheme. We first present our main result in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. We can securely multiply two matrices using N
servers, T of which may collude, with N > 2T , with an upload
cost of NN−2T . In other words, an (N,N − 2T, T ) SDMM
scheme for two input matrices is achievable.
We present the following example to illustrate the essential
ingredients of the scheme. For ease of notation, we use the
notation A(1) = A and A(2) = B in this section.
Example: We consider distributed multiplication of matri-
ces A ∈ Fm×nq and B ∈ Fn×pq over N = 7 servers, any T = 2
of which may collude (see Fig. 1).
1) Sharing phase: The matrices A and B are partitioned
into K = N−2T = 3 blocks of dimensions m× n3 and n3 ×p,
respectively, as follows:
A =
[
A1 A2 A3
]
,B =
 B1B2
B3
 , (5)
and the product C = AB is given by
C = A1B1 + A2B2 + A3B3. (6)
The matrices Ri ∈ Fm×
n
K
q and Si ∈ F
n
K×p
q , i ∈ [T ], are
generated, whose entries are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) uniform random variables from the finite field
5Fq . The matrices R = [R1, . . . ,RT ] and S = [S1, . . . ,ST ] are
used as the secret keys to encode the input matrices A and B,
respectively. The following two polynomials are constructed
to encode the matrices:
A(x) = A1 + A2x+ A3x
2 + R1x
3 + R2x
4 (7)
B(x) = B1 + B2x
−1 + B3x−2 + S1x−5 + S2x−6. (8)
Note that the encoding polynomials of A and B are different
from each other, depending on the order of multiplication. We
refer to the encoding of matrix A as “left-encoding”, and that
of matrix B as “right-encoding”. We refer to each of the N
secret shares obtained from left-encoding of matrix A as an
“(N,K, T ) left-share”, where the ith,∀i ∈ [N ] secret share is
denoted by [[A]]Li , and each of those from right-encoding of
matrix B as an “(N,K, T ) right-share”, where the ith,∀i ∈
[N ] secret share is denoted by [[B]]Ri .
Let α7 be a primitive 7th root of unity in Fq , and
1, α7, α
2
7, . . . , α
6
7 be the 7
th roots of unity in Fq . Then the
polynomials A(x) and B(x) are evaluated at αi−17 to obtain
[[A]]Li , [[B]]
R
i ; that is, [[A]]
L
i = A(α
i−1
7 ) and [[B]]
R
i =
B(αi−17 ), i = 1, . . . , 7, and the secret shares [[A]]
L
i , [[B]]
R
i
are sent to server i, i = 1, . . . , 7. The number of sym-
bols sent by the source nodes to the servers is given by
H([[A]]i) +H([[B]]i) =
mn
K +
np
K .
Remark 2. We note here that evaluating the
polynomials A(x) and B(x) at the roots of unity is
equivalent to computing the discrete Fourier transform
of the sequences {A1, . . . ,AK ,R1, . . . ,RT } and
{B1, . . . ,BK ,01, . . . ,0T ,S1, . . . ,ST } in a finite field,
where 0k, k = 1, . . . , T, are zero matrices. This can be
carried out efficiently using the FFT algorithm for finite fields
introduced in [27].
2) Computation phase: Server i computes the product
[[C]]i = [[AB]]i = [[A]]
L
i [[B]]
R
i , (9)
which is equivalent to the evaluation of the polynomial
C(x) =A(x)B(x) (10)
=A1S2x
−6 + (A1S1 + A2S2)x−5
+ · · ·+ (A1B2 + A2B3 + R2S1)x−1
+
(
3∑
l=1
AlBl
)
+ · · ·+ R2B1x4 (11)
at x = αi−17 .
3) Reconstruction phase: The servers send [[C]]i’s to the
user. We know that
N∑
i=1
(αi−1N )
s = 0, ∀s : N - s. (12)
Therefore, the user computes the average of the received
responses to obtain the final result:
1
7
7∑
i=1
[[C]]i =
3∑
l=1
AlBl, (13)
because the non-constant terms from Eq. (11) sum to 0 thanks
to Eq. (12).
For the general case with N servers, T of which can
collude, the input matrices are partitioned into K = N − 2T
submatrices similarly to Eq. (5). Then the product can be
written as C = AB =
∑K
l=1 AlBl.
The matrices A and B are encoded with the following two
polynomials:
A(x) =
K∑
l=1
Alx
l−1 +
T∑
l=1
Rlx
K+l−1, (14)
and
B(x) =
K∑
l=1
Blx
−l+1 +
T∑
l=1
Slx
−K−T−l+1. (15)
We define the product polynomial as follows.
C(x) =
K∑
l=1
AlBl + (non-constant terms). (16)
The goal is to recover the constant term in C(x) from the
computations of N servers.
Remark 3. Since the polynomials must be evaluated at the
N th roots of unity in the proposed scheme, the finite field
must be chosen to guarantee the presence of all the N th order
roots of unity. Therefore, we must have N |(q − 1). This can
be satisfied by appropriately choosing the field size q.
The polynomials A(x) and B(x) are evaluated at the N th
roots of unity, denoted by 1, αN , α2N , . . . , α
N−1
N ∈ Fq , where
αN is a primitive N th root of unity in Fq . Thus, the values
sent to server i are [[A]]Li = A(α
i−1
N ) and [[B]]
R
i = B(α
i−1
N ).
Server i ∈ [N ] computes the share [[C]]i = [[A]]Li [[B]]Ri =
C(αi−1N ), and sends it to the user.
Thanks to Eq. (12), the user obtains the desired result by
averaging the received [[C]]i’s.
1
N
N∑
i=1
[[C]]i =
K∑
l=1
AlBl. (17)
A. Special case: Computation with own data
For the special case in which the data matrices belong to
the user, the upload cost can be further reduced since the user
also has access to the random secret keys used for generating
the secret shares. Most previous literature on SDMM considers
this special case. The user partitions the input matrices into
K blocks as in Eq. (5), where K = N − T . The user then
encodes the matrices using the following polynomials.
A(x) =
K∑
l=1
Alx
l−1 +
T∑
l=1
Rlx
K+l−1, (18)
and
B(x) =
K∑
l=1
Blx
−l+1 +
T∑
l=1
Slx
−K−l+1, (19)
where A(x) is the same as in Eq. (14) while we have a
slight change from Eq. (15) in the way the secret key is
6embedded into the B(x) polynomial. The user evaluates the
polynomials on the N th roots of unity to generate the secret
shares, and sends these shares to the servers. The servers
return their computed results back to the user, where the
constant term in the product polynomial C(x) is now given by∑K
i=1 AiBi+
∑T
i=1 RiSi. The user then averages the received
results to obtain
1
N
N∑
i=1
[[C]]i =
K∑
l=1
AlBl +
T∑
l=1
RlSl. (20)
Since the user has access to the secret keys it has used to en-
crypt the partitions, it can subtract their product,
∑T
i=1 RiSi,
to obtain the desired result. We note here that the product of
the random matrices R and S needs to be pre-computed by
the user in order to obtain the desired matrix product from
Eq. (20). If T << N − T , this would require much less
computational resources compared to multiplying the matrices
A and B, or alternatively these multiplications can be done in
advance in an offline manner, and stored at the user, and hence,
this computation does not affect the computation latency.
Theorem 3. A (N,N − T, T ) SDMM scheme for two input
matrices is achievable for the special case, or in other words,
we can securely multiply two matrices using N servers, T of
which may collude, with N > T , with an optimal upload cost
of NN−T .
Proof. It follows from the definition of an SDMM scheme that
the upload cost of the (N,N−T, T ) SDMM scheme proposed
above is χUL = NN−T . Moreover, it is proved in [24] that the
optimal upload cost of an SDMM scheme is lower bounded
by NN−T . This proves the optimality of the proposed scheme
in terms of the upload cost.
B. Proof of security against the servers
We next prove that the proposed scheme is secure, i.e., the
security constraint (3) is satisfied. We point out that there is no
exchange of messages between the servers, that is, Mi,i′ = φ
for all i, i′ ∈ [N ], i 6= i′. For any L with |L| = T , we have
I(A,B; [[A]]L, [[B]]L) = H([[A]]L, [[B]]L) (21)
−H([[A]]L, [[B]]L|A,B)
(22)
a
= H([[A]]L, [[B]]L)−H(R,S) (23)
b
= H([[A]]L) +H([[B]]L)−H(R)−H(S)
(24)
≤
∑
i∈L
H([[A]]i) +
∑
i∈L
H([[B]]i)
− mnT
K
log |Fq| − pnT
K
log |Fq|
(25)
= 0, (26)
where (a) follows from (14) and (15); (b) follows from the
fact that [[A]]L, [[B]]L, R and S are independent of each
other; (26) follows because the elements of the secret shares
[[A]]i ∈ Fm×
n
K
q and [[B]]i ∈ F
n
K×p
q ,∀i ∈ L are independent
and uniformly distributed in Fq . Hence,
∑
i∈LH([[A]]i) =
mnT
K log |Fq| and
∑
i∈LH([[B]]i) =
pnT
K log |Fq|, where |Fq|
denotes the cardinality of the field Fq .
C. Security against the user
When the input matrices are generated by distributed source
nodes, the user must not gain additional information beyond
the result of the computation. Most existing schemes [13],
[16], [18], [22] which rely on polynomial interpolation, do
not satisfy this condition, since they are designed for the case
when the data is generated by the user. If those schemes are
employed, once C(x) = A(x)B(x) is interpolated by the user
after receiving the evaluations of C(x) at a number of points
equal to the number of terms in C(x), it can be factorized
to obtain information about A(x) and B(x), thus leaking
additional information to the user. Our scheme is robust to
such information leakages.
We point out that besides the constant term, the user can also
compute the sum of the coefficients of xi and x−i, i ∈ [N −
1], in Eq. (11). We observe in Eq. (11) that the non-constant
terms are uniformly distributed in Fm×pq and are independent,
so that no information can be gained about A or B from
computing those terms. Since only N evaluations of C(x),
which is of degree 2N−1, are received by the user, it cannot be
interpolated, and indeed, the user cannot gain any information
about the input matrices beyond their product [17].
D. Other performance metrics
1) Encoding complexity: To compute N evaluations of the
matrix polynomial A(x) on the roots of unity, the source
nodes perform mnK N-point FFTs, which involve O(
mnN logN
K )
finite field operations in Fq . For T = 0, the complexity
is O(mn logN), that is, it is a logarithmic rate of growth
with respect to N . The analysis is similar for computing the
evaluations of matrix polynomial B(x).
2) Download cost: Download cost is the normalized num-
ber of bits that need to be downloaded by the user from the
servers to reconstruct the computation result. It is defined as
χDL =
∑N
i=1H([[C]]i)
H(C)
. (27)
As shown in [19], the download cost depends on the
dimensions of the data matrices. The following lemma from
[19] determines the entropy of the product of two matrices
depending on their dimensions.
Lemma 4. Let A,B be random matrices independently and
uniformly distributed over Fm×nq and Fn×pq , respectively. As
q →∞, we have
H(AB) =
{
mp n ≥ min(m, p)
mn+ np− n2 n < min(m, p) , (28)
in q−ary units.
Therefore, we can compute the download cost of our scheme
for three different cases.
7• If min(m, p) ≤ n ≤ K min(m, p), the download cost is
χDL =
N(mnK +
np
K − n
2
K2 )
mp
(29)
=
Nn(m+ p− nK )
Kmp
. (30)
Assuming m = p, we have χDL ≈ 2nNmK < 2NK .
• If n ≥ K min(m, p), the download cost is
χDL =
Nmp
mp
(31)
= N. (32)
• If n < min(m, p), the download cost is
χDL =
N(mnK +
np
K − n
2
K2 )
mn+ np− n2 (33)
=
N(m+ p− nK )
K(m+ p− n) . (34)
For m, p →∞, χDL → NK = NN−T . This is the optimal
download cost.
3) Decoding complexity: Since the decoding requires com-
puting the sum of the received results, the decoding complexity
of the proposed scheme is negligible. This is an important
advantage of the proposed scheme compared to existing
polynomial coding schemes in the literature, which require
polynomial interpolation.
E. Comparison with other schemes
There exists a trade-off between the upload cost and the
download cost depending on the kind of partitioning employed
for matrix multiplication. In [24], [28], the trade-off within the
class of schemes that employ row-by-column partitioning is
considered. The other class of schemes that employ column-
by-row partitioning, like MatDot and our scheme, provide
different points on the upload cost-download cost trade-off.
The GASP [18], secure PolyDot [22], and USCSA [24]
schemes, which employ row-by-column partitioning generally
result in a higher upload cost and lower download cost
than those employing column-by-row partitioning. Consider
K row-wise partitions of A, and K column-wise partitions of
B. For T = 0, the matrices are encoded by evaluating their
corresponding polynomials at N = K2 distinct points in Fq .
SDMM schemes employing the row-by-column partitioning
require N = O(K2) servers. Hence, the upload cost is χUL =
N
K = O(
N√
N
) = O(
√
N). Since the complexity of evaluating
a polynomial at N points is O(N logN2 log logN) [29], the
total encoding complexity is O(mn√
N
N log2N log logN) ≈
O(mn
√
N log2N log logN). This is significantly larger than
the encoding complexity of our scheme, which grows only
logarithmically with N .
The secure MatDot scheme of [22], which employs column-
by-row partitioning, has an upload cost of χUL = 2NN−2T+1 ,
which is also larger than that of our scheme by a factor of
two (see Fig. 2).
Compared to [25], which also considers the general case
with the source nodes separate from the user, our scheme
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the upload cost of SDMM of two matrices for different
number of colluding servers out of a total of N = 20 servers. Only the
values of T ≤ 9 are considered since the proposed scheme is defined only
for T < N/2. The maximum value of K is calculated for each T .
provides significant improvements in terms of the upload cost.
The upload cost achieved by the scheme in [25] is given by
χUL =
min(2K2+2T−3,K2+KT+T−2)
K , which is significantly
higher than that provided by our scheme (see Fig. 2). We
also highlight that, as opposed to the scheme in [25], our
scheme does not require inter-server communication in the
computation and communication phases for multiplying two
matrices, which significantly reduces both the latency and the
complexity.
IV. STRAGGLER MITIGATION
The FFT-based scheme in the previous sections does not
provide robustness against straggling servers. We need all
the evaluations from all the servers to recover the desired
result. In this section we present an extension of our FFT-
based scheme, which provides a certain level of robustness
to straggling servers by incorporating both column-wise and
row-wise partitioning of the matrices.
When providing straggler mitigation, typically the goal is to
minimize the recovery threshold, which refers to the minimum
number of responsive servers. Hence, instead of specifying
the number of servers, and minimizing the upload cost, in
this section, we consider arbitrary partitioning of the matrices,
and identify the corresponding upload cost and the recovery
threshold.
In particular, we employ row-wise partitioning of A (and
column-wise for B) to introduce straggler-robustness. That is,
A is partitioned into a K2 ×K1 array of equal-sized blocks,
and B is partitioned into a K1 × K3 array of equal-sized
blocks. The idea is that the secret shares of each row of A
(and each column of B) are generated, while polynomially-
coded shares of each column of A (and each row of B)
are generated for straggler robustness. The proposed scheme
requires N ≥ K2K3(K1 + 2T ) responsive servers in general,
and N ≥ K2K3(K1 + T ) responsive servers for computing
with own data.
8The matrices A and B are partitioned into K1K2 and K2K3
blocks, denoted by Ai,j , i ∈ [K2], j ∈ [K1] and Bj,k, j ∈
[K1], k ∈ [K3], respectively. Matrices Ri,j , i ∈ [K2], j ∈ [T ],
and Sj,k, j ∈ [T ], k ∈ [K3], are generated, whose entries are
i.i.d. uniform random variables from Fq . The matrices R and
S, defined as
R =
 R1,1 · · · R1,T... . . . ...
RK2,1 · · · RK2,T
 , (35)
S =
 S1,1 · · · S1,K3... . . . ...
ST,1 · · · ST,K3
 , (36)
are used as secret keys to encode the matrices A and B,
respectively, by first appending them in the following manner:
A˜ =
[
A R
]
, (37)
B˜ =
[
B
S
]
, (38)
and then constructing the following multivariate polynomials:
A(x1, x2) =
K2∑
i=1
K1∑
j=1
Ai,jx
i−1
2 x
j−1
1
+
K2∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
Ri,jx
i−1
2 x
K1+j−1
1 (39)
B(x1, x2) =
K1∑
j=1
K3∑
k=1
Bj,kx
−(j−1)
1 x
(k−1)K2
2
+
T∑
j=1
K3∑
k=1
Sj,kx
−(K1+T+j−1)
1 x
(k−1)K2
2 .
(40)
The product polynomial C(x1, x2) is given by
C(x1, x2) =
K2∑
i=1
K3∑
k=1
K1∑
j=1
Ai,jBj,k
xK2(k−1)+i−12 +
(terms with non-zero powers of x1). (41)
A. Sharing phase
Let there be a total of N ≥ N1N2 servers, where N1 =
K1 + 2T and N2 ≥ K2K3. The user evaluates polynomials
A(x1, x2) and B(x1, x2) at points (x1, x2) = (αrN1 , βs), r =
0, . . . , N1 − 1, s = 0, . . . , N2 − 1, where αN1 is a primitive
N th1 root of unity in Fq , and βs,∀s ∈ [N2] are distinct points
in Fq .
The user sends A(αrN1 , βs) and B(α
r
N1
, βs) to server i,
where i = (s− 1)N1 + r − 1,∀r ∈ [N1],∀s ∈ [N2].
B. Computation phase
Server i, where i = (s − 1)N1 + r − 1, computes
C(αrN1 , βs) = A(α
r
N1
, βs)B(α
r
N1
, βs), and sends this share
to the user as soon as it is computed.
C. Reconstruction phase
The user collects and computes the averages of all the
evaluations of C(x1, x2) on the points having the same x2
coordinate, which removes the terms with non-zero exponents
of x1. Therefore, for every x2 ∈ [N2], the user obtains
f(x2) =
1
N1
N1−1∑
i=0
C(αiN1 , x2) (42)
=
K2∑
i=1
K3∑
k=1
K1∑
j=1
Ai,jBj,k
xK2(k−1)+i−12 . (43)
The user then interpolates the polynomial f(x2) from any
K2K3 evaluations to obtain
∑K1
j=1 Ai,jBj,k for all (i, k) ∈
[K2]× [K3], therefore obtaining the final result C = AB.
Remark 4. Note that, to reconstruct the desired result, the
user requires all N1 evaluations on the points (x1, x2) for
x1 = 1, αN1 , . . . , α
N1−1
N1
and constant x2. In other words,
for any K2K3 values of s, the results from all the groups of
servers [(s − 1)N1 : sN1 − 1] are necessary and sufficient
for reconstructing the desired result. Therefore, this scheme
provides a slightly weaker ‘group-wise’ straggler-robustness.
D. Special case: computation with own data
For the special case when the data matrices belong to the
user, the encoding polynomials are constructed by the user as
follows.
A(x1, x2) =
K2∑
i=1
K1∑
j=1
Ai,jx
i−1
2 x
j−1
1 +
K2∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
Ri,jx
i−1
2 x
K1+j−1
1
(44)
B(x1, x2) =
K1∑
j=1
K3∑
k=1
Bj,kx
−(j−1)
1 x
K2(k−1)
2 (45)
+
T∑
j=1
K3∑
k=1
Sj,kx
−(K1+j−1)
1 x
K2(k−1)
2 .
(46)
By this construction, the matrices R and S also appear in
the constant coefficient of the polynomials f(x2), and the user
must pre-compute the products of the private random matrices
in order to obtain the desired result.
E. Performance Analysis:
• Upload Cost: We have χUL = N(K3mn+K2np)K1K2K3(mn+np) .
• Encoding complexity: The complexity
of encoding matrix A for N servers is
O
(
mn
K1K2
(N1 logN1)
(
N2 log
2N2 log logN2
))
. The
encoding complexity for matrix B can be computed
similarly.
• Decoding complexity: The decoding requires addition,
which has negligible complexity compared to multipli-
cation in a finite field, followed by interpolation of a
polynomial with K2K3 terms, which has complexity
O(n log2 n log log n) for n = K2K3 [29]. Note that the
decoding complexity of secure PolyDot scheme in [22]
9is given by the complexity of interpolating a polynomial
with K2K3(K1 +T )+K2K1 +K2T−1 terms, while our
scheme requires interpolating a polynomial with K2K3
terms, which is an order of magnitude smaller.
• Field size: The field must have the N th1 roots of unity,
and must be big enough to have K2K3 distinct elements.
Therefore, N1|q − 1 and q > K2K3 must be satisfied.
V. SECURE DISTRIBUTED MULTIPLICATION OF MULTIPLE
MATRICES
In this section, we consider the multiplication of multiple
matrices. Such computations, known as matrix chain multi-
plications, occur in many applications in signal processing,
graph theory, and network analysis. We extend our scheme
proposed in Section III to implement multiplication of multiple
matrices, that is, given Γ source nodes generating the matrices
A(1), . . . ,A(Γ), the user wants to obtain the product C =
G(A(1), . . . ,A(Γ)) = A(1) · · ·A(Γ) securely from distributed
computation over N available servers. A naive method would
be for the servers to securely compute the multiplication of
two matrices at a time using the proposed scheme in Section
III, and send the results of the computations to the user so
that he reconstructs the intermediate computation results, that
is, the product of a subset of the matrices, before re-encoding
the intermediate result and sending its secret shares to the
servers to multiply with the next matrix. However, such a naive
method incurs an unnecessary amount of communication cost
between the user and the servers, and also requires the user
to re-encode the intermediate matrices multiple times, thus
increasing the latency of the computation. The naive method
also leaks information about the intermediate computations to
the user. Next, we propose a more efficient alternative, that
also satisfies the user privacy constraint.
The following scheme proceeds iteratively in multiple
rounds by obtaining the shares of C(γ) , A(1) · · ·A(γ),
denoted by [[C(γ)]]i , [[A(1) · · ·A(γ)]]i,∀i ∈ [N ], in the
(γ − 1)th round, for γ ∈ [Γ].
A. Sharing phase
For K = N − 2T , the (N,N − 2T, T ) left-shares [[A(1)]]Li
and right-shares [[A(γ)]]Ri , ∀γ ∈ [2 : Γ], are sent to server i.
B. Computation phase
In the computation phase of the γth round, where γ ∈
[Γ − 1], server i ∈ [N ] computes the shares [[H(γ+1)]]i =
[[C(γ)]]Li [[A
(γ+1)]]Ri , ∀γ ∈ [Γ − 1]. The secret shares
[[H(γ+1)]]i are evaluations on the N th roots of unity of
a polynomial H(γ+1)(x), which is similar to the product
polynomial obtained in Eq. (11), and whose constant term is
the matrix C(γ+1) = C(γ)A(γ+1), while the remaining terms
are uniformly distributed random matrices.
C. Communication phase
In the communication phase, the servers exchange shares
of their results from the computation phase in a secure way,
similarly to [25], to convert their secret shares [[H(γ+1)]] to
(N,N − 2T, T ) left-shares of matrix C(γ+1). To do this,
• Server i generates (N,N − 2T, T ) left-shares of
[[H(γ+1)]]i, evaluated on the N th roots of unity
αj−1N ,∀j ∈ [N ], with αN being a primitive N th root
of unity in Fq , and enumerated as [[H(γ+1)]]Li,j =[[
[[H(γ+1)]]i
]]L
j
,∀j ∈ [N ].
• Server i sends the left-share [[H(γ+1)]]Li,j to server j.
The privacy requirement against the servers is satisfied,
since any T colluding servers cannot gain any information
about server i’s share [[H(γ+1)]]i from the left-shares
received in the communication phase.
• Server j averages the received left-shares
[[H(γ+1)]]Li,j ,∀i ∈ [N ], to obtain the (N,N − 2T, T )
left-shares [[C(γ+1)]]Lj .
To see the correctness of the above procedure, note that, for
given N,K and T values, the secret sharing scheme is linear
for both left and right shares; that is, [[A]]+[[B]] = [[A+B]].
Therefore, following from Eq. (17), we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
[[H(γ+1)]]Li,j =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[[
[[H(γ+1)]]i
]]L
j
(47)
=
[[
C(γ+1)
]]L
j
. (48)
The scheme proceeds in a recursive manner, looping back
to the computation phase for the (γ + 1)th round.
D. Reconstruction phase
At the end of the (Γ− 1)th round, the servers have access
to the secret shares of the matrix C(Γ) = A(1) · · ·A(Γ). The
servers send the shares [[C(Γ)]]i,∀i ∈ [N ], to the user, which
then computes the average of these shares to obtain
1
N
N∑
i=1
[[C(Γ)]]i = A
(1) · · ·A(Γ). (49)
E. Performance analysis
Upload cost: Each server receives one (N,N−2T, T ) share
of all A(γ), γ ∈ [Γ]. Thus we have
χUL =
∑N
i=1
∑Γ
γ=1
H([[A(γ)]]i)
K∑Γ
γ=1H(A
(γ))
(50)
=
N
N − 2T . (51)
Encoding complexity: Since the encoding involves the
computation of FFT, the complexity is O(mγm′γ
N
K logN) for
encoding the matrix A(γ),∀γ ∈ [Γ].
Decoding complexity: The partial decoding in the commu-
nication phase of each intermediate round, as well as the final
decoding of the result after the completion of the (Γ − 1)th
round requires only the addition of the received results from all
the servers. Therefore, the decoding complexity is negligible.
Privacy against the user: The scheme constructed in this
section preserves privacy against the user, since the interme-
diate computation results are not communicated to the user in
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Fig. 3. Conversion from left-share to right-share (right-share to left-share conversion can be done similarly).
any form. In contrast, this privacy constraint is violated by the
naive scheme described at the start of this section, because the
user obtains the result of each intermediate computation.
VI. SECURE MATRIX ALGEBRA
In this section, we describe algorithms for performing
matrix operations besides matrix multiplication that are useful
in matrix algebra. Some operations, like matrix inversion, can
be reduced to matrix multiplication, and can be implemented
with the SDMM schemes described in the preceding sections.
A. Matrix addition and multiplication by a scalar
Addition and scalar multiplication follow easily from the
linear nature of the secret sharing scheme. We have [[A +
B]] = [[A]] + [[B]], and [[cA]] = c[[A]], where c ∈ Fq . For
addition, the shares must both be either left-shares or right-
shares.
B. Changing from (N,K1, T1) left-shares to (N,K2, T2)
right-shares
Suppose the servers store (N,K1, T1) left-shares of matrix
A. The goal is to let the servers obtain (N,K2, T2) right-
shares of matrix A. A special case of this algorithm with
K1 = 1, K2 = N − 2T and T1 = T2 = T was used earlier in
the communication phase of Section V. The procedure takes
the following steps (see Fig. 3):
1) Server i generates (N,K2, T2) right-shares of [[A]]Li
evaluated on the N th roots of unity αj−1N ,∀j ∈ [N ], and
enumerated as [[A]]LRi,j =
[[
[[A]]Li
]]R
j
,∀j ∈ [N ].
2) Server i ∈ [N ] sends the right-share [[A]]LRi,j to server j.
3) Server j interpolates the received shares [[A]]LRi,j , i =
1, . . . , N , using inverse FFT (IFFT) to obtain a poly-
nomial whose first K1 coefficients are K1 column-wise
partitions of the share [[A]]Rj . Stacking them column-wise
gives the share [[A]]Rj .
A procedure to convert right-shares to left-shares can be
obtained similarly to the above procedure. For example, to
convert right-shares to left-shares, step 1 of the above proce-
dure generates (N,K2, T2) left-shares of [[A]]Ri , enumerated
as [[A]]RLi,j =
[[
[[A]]Ri
]]L
j
,∀j ∈ [N ].
To see the correctness of the above procedure,
note that IFFT of a sequence of (N,K1, T1) left-
shares
{
[[A]]L1 , . . . , [[A]]
L
N
}
gives the sequence
{A1, . . . ,AK1 ,R1, . . . ,RT1}. Similarly, IFFT of a sequence
of (N,K1, T1) right-shares
{
[[A]]R1 , . . . , [[A]]
R
N
}
gives the
sequence {A1, . . . ,AK1 ,01, . . . ,0T1 ,R1, . . . ,RT1}, where
the subscript l ∈ [T1] in 0l is added only to count the number
of zero matrices. Since each coefficient of the IFFT sequence
is a linear combination of the elements of the input sequence;
for all l ∈ [K1], the lth coefficient of the IFFT, denoted by
IFFTl(.), of the sequence of shares received by server j is
given by
IFFTl
(
[[A]]LR1,j , . . . , [[A]]
LR
N,j
)
(52)
= IFFTl
([[
[[A]]L1
]]R
j
, . . . ,
[[
[[A]]LN
]]R
j
)
(53)
=
[[
IFFTl
(
[[A]]L1 , . . . , [[A]]
L
N
)]]R
j
(54)
= [[Al]]
R
j , (55)
where Al, l ∈ [K1] is the lth column-wise partition used for
obtaining the original (N,K1, T1) left-shares of matrix A.
Thus, server j obtains the secret shares [[Al]]Rj , l = 1, . . . ,K1.
Remark 5. For K1 ≥ 2, left-shares cannot be directly
converted to left-shares using the above procedure. Sim-
ilarly, right-shares cannot be directly converted to right-
shares. However, (N, 1, T1) left-shares can be directly con-
verted to both (N,K2, T2) left-shares and right-shares using
the above procedure. For converting (N, 1, T1) left-shares
to (N,K2, T2) left-shares, step 1 of the above procedure
generates (N,K2, T2) left-shares of [[A]]Li , enumerated as
[[A]]LLi,j =
[[
[[A]]Li
]]L
j
,∀j ∈ [N ].
C. Transpose of a matrix
Consider that server i stores a (N,K1, T1) left-share of
A, i ∈ [N ]. The goal is to obtain a procedure, through which
the servers end up with the (N,K2, T2) left-shares of Atr
instead. The procedure takes the following steps:
1) Server i ∈ [N ] performs the transpose operation on the
left-share [[A]]Li , to obtain a share [[A
tr]]i = ([[A]]
L
i )
tr.
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We have
[[Atr]]i = ([[A]]
L
i )
tr (56)
=
K1∑
l=1
Atrl α
(i−1)(l−1)
N +
T1∑
l=1
Rtrl α
(i−1)(K+l−1)
N ,
(57)
where Atrl , l = 1, . . . ,K1 are equivalent to row-wise
partitions of Atr. Note that [[Atr]]i is neither a left-
share nor a right-share, but is equivalent to having a row-
wise partitioning of Atr employed in right-encoding, and
having the exponents of the secret keys employed in left-
encoding.
2) Server i then generates (N,K2, T2) left-shares of [[Atr]]i
evaluated on the N th roots of unity αj−1N ,∀j ∈ [N ], and
enumerated as [[Atr]]Li,j =
[[
[[Atr]]i
]]L
j
,∀j ∈ [N ].
3) Server i sends the left-share [[Atr]]Li,j to server j.
4) Server j interpolates the received shares [[Atr]]Li,j , i =
1, . . . , N , using IFFT to obtain the first K1 coefficients,
which are K1 row-wise partitions of the share [[Atr]]Lj .
Stacking them row-wise gives the share [[Atr]]Lj .
D. Exponentiation
Suppose the user wants to compute G(A) = Ar, r ∈ N.
(N,N − 2T, T ) left-shares of matrix A are sent to the
servers. The servers then implement the scheme to generate
(N,N − 2T, T ) right-shares of matrix A as described in
Section VI-B. Thus, the servers now have the shares of matrix
A for left and right multiplication. The servers then implement
the scheme for multiple matrix multiplication described in
Section V. If r = 2n, the computation can be done in log r
rounds of computation and communication phases by comput-
ing A2,A4,A8, . . . ,Ar in successive rounds. If r 6= 2n, then
consider the binary expansion {aB−1, . . . , a0} of r, such that
r =
∑B−1
i=0 ai2
i, where B is the maximum number of bits
required to represent r. Then, the desired result is given by
Ar = A
∑B−1
i=0 ai2
i
(58)
=
B−1∏
i=0
Aai2
i
. (59)
If the Hamming weight of the binary expansion of r is h, then
the computation requires h − 1 extra rounds of computation
and communication phases to perform the computation of Eq.
(59), resulting in a total of log r + h− 1 rounds.
Upload cost: (N,N − 2T, T ) left-shares of matrix A are
uploaded by the source, while the (N,N−2T, T ) right-shares
of matrix A are generated in-situ by the share-conversion
algorithm, therefore not required to be sent by the source.
Therefore, we have χUL = NN−2T .
E. Solving the linear system AX = B with secure Gaussian
elimination
The linear system AX = B, where the elements of A
and B belong to Fq , can be solved by performing Gaussian
elimination (GE) on the augmented matrix (A|B). Setting
B equal to the identity matrix, the solution of the linear
system also gives the matrix inverse A−1, if it exists. The GE
method performs elementary row operations on the augmented
matrix of the linear system, and row interchanges, also called
pivoting, to transform the linear system into its row-echelon
form. A scheme for secure GE is described in [5], which takes
element-wise secret shares of matrices A and B as inputs, and
outputs the solution of the linear system. Computing element-
wise secret shares of a matrix is equivalent to computing
(N, 1, T ) secret shares of matrices A and B. Therefore, if
the servers store (N,K, T ) secret shares of matrix A and B,
they must first be converted to (N, 1, T ) secret shares using
the scheme in Section VI-B.
F. Secure matrix inversion
Besides solving the linear system AX = I to compute
the matrix inverse, as described in the previous section, a
different procedure, inspired from that in [6], is described
below, through which the servers start from (N,K, T ) right-
shares of a square matrix A ∈ Fm×mq , and end up with
(N,K, T ) left-shares of A−1 instead.
1) A uniformly distributed random matrix Φ ∈ Fm×mq ,
which is used as the secret key, is secretly shared with
the servers. We assume that there is no central entity that
can generate and share the secret key securely with the
servers. The shares of the secret key are generated by the
servers in a decentralized manner as follows: For i ∈ [N ],
server i generates a random matrix Φ(i) ∈ Fm×mq , and
generates its (N,K, T ) left-shares evaluated on the N th
roots of unity αj−1N ,∀j ∈ [N ]. Server i sends the left-
share [[Φ(i)]]Lj to server j ∈ [N ] \ {i}. From the left-
shares received by server j, it computes the left-share
[[Φ]]Lj = [[Φ
(1) + · · · + Φ(N)]]Lj = [[Φ(1)]]Lj + · · · +
[[Φ(N)]]Lj . Thus, each server obtains a left-share of a
common secret key Φ = Φ(1) + · · ·+ Φ(N).
2) Server j securely computes [[P]]j = [[ΦA]]j =
[[Φ]]Lj [[A]]
R
j .
3) The servers reconstruct matrix P from its secret shares
by exchanging their secret shares of matrix P with every
other server, and averaging the received shares, similar
to Eq. (17). Thus, each server obtains the public matrix
P = ΦA. The servers gain no information of the matrix
A from the matrix P, therefore satisfying the privacy
constraint against the servers.
4) Each server computes the matrix inverse P−1 =
A−1Φ−1.
5) For j = 1, . . . , N , server j then obtains a left-share of the
inverse of matrix A as follows: [[A−1]]Lj = P
−1[[Φ]]Lj =
[[P−1Φ]]Lj .
6) The servers can now perform further computation on the
left-shares obtained, or deliver their left-shares to the user,
who then performs IFFT on the received results to obtain
the matrix A−1.
Upload cost: (N,N−2T, T ) shares of matrix A are uploaded
by the source for Step 2, where SDMM of random matrix Φ
and input matrix A is performed, thus incurring an upload
cost of χUL = NN−2T .
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G. Iterative matrix inversion
The method for secure matrix inversion introduced above
includes an intermediate step (step 4) that involves the in-
version of a secure full-size matrix at each server. While the
procedure satisfies the privacy requirements, it may contradict
with the motivation of distributed computation. Iterative matrix
inversion algorithms, for example Newton’s method [30], do
not involve direct matrix inversions, but instead proceed with
matrix multiplications, and therefore, are amenable to effi-
cient distributed implementation. Newton’s method, however,
provides only an approximation of the matrix inverse. New-
ton’s method for inverting matrices is derived from Newton’s
method for finding the root of a function. The procedure is as
follows [30]:
• Set f(X) = A−X−1. Note that the root of f(X) is A−1.
Apply Newton’s method for finding its root, as follows:
Xi+1 = µiXi (2I−AXi) , (60)
where µi = 1 for all i > 0.
• Choosing the initial estimate X0: Quadratic conver-
gence is obtained if ||AX0 − I|| < 1. This is satisfied
if X0 = µoAT is picked as the initial estimate, with the
value of µ0 as proposed in [30].
The matrix addition and multiplication operations can be per-
formed securely in a distributed manner using the algorithms
described in this paper.
H. Computation of arbitrary polynomials:
The algorithms for securely performing matrix addition,
transpose, exponentiation, inverse and multiplication that have
been described in this paper allow the user to compute
arbitrary matrix polynomials on distributed servers. Therefore,
a function of the following form,
G(A1,A2,A3) = A
2
1A2 + cA
−1
3 , (61)
for example, can be computed securely on distributed servers
as follows: first, the servers securely compute A21A2 using the
scheme for multiple matrix multiplication; then, the servers
add the shares [[A21A2]] to the shares [[cA
−1
3 ]], computed
using one of the secure matrix inversion methods described,
to finally obtain the secret shares of the final result, which the
user receives and decodes to obtain the desired result.
I. Secure learning from local datasets
Consider that data from D source nodes, each with a
different size of dataset, is used for training a fully connected
deep neural network. In a fully connected neural network,
the input layer of neurons performs the matrix multiplication
WX, where W is the weight matrix associated with the layer
of neurons, and X = (X1, . . . ,XD), where Xi, i ∈ [D] is
the dataset belonging to source node i. SDMM schemes in
[16], [18], [24], [25], based on column-wise partitioning of
matrix X, code across different data points, thus requiring
the local datasets of the sources to be encoded at a central
location, which leads to a privacy concern. In contrast, the
SDMM algorithm proposed in this paper, based on row-wise
partitioning of matrix X, encodes each dataset independently.
We have
[[X]]R =
(
[[X1]]
R, . . . , [[XD]]
R
)
, (62)
that is, each source can deliver the right shares of its dataset
to the servers independent of other sources.
Linear regression- Consider the computation of the MMSE
estimate in a linear regression problem, where the optimum
estimate is given by β = (XtrX)−1 XtrY. The local datasets
(Xi,Yi) can be delivered to the servers similarly to Eq. (62),
and then the left-shares and right-shares of Xtr and Y can
be generated by using the algorithms to convert shares and
perform secure transpose described in this section.
J. Achieving the optimal upload and download cost for SDMM
If we assume that the cost of inter-server communication
is negligible compared to the upload and download costs,
optimal communication costs can be achieved simultaneously
for both upload and download while ignoring the inter-server
communication costs. The source nodes upload (N,N−T, T )
shares of the input matrices to the servers, resulting in an
upload cost of χUL = NN−T , which is shown to be a
lower bound on the upload cost for SDMM in [24]. Using
the algorithm proposed in Section VI-B, the (N,N − T, T )
shares can then be converted to (N,N − 2T, T ) shares for
implementing the SDMM algorithm proposed in this paper.
The secret shares of the computation results are then converted
to (N,N − T, T ) shares using the algorithm in Section VI-B.
These shares are sent to the user, resulting in a download cost
of χDL = NN−T , which is known to be the optimal download
cost for SDMM [16]. This procedure circumvents the trade-
off between the upload cost and the download cost for SDMM
schemes, studied earlier in [24].
The assumption that the cost of inter-server communication
is negligible is justified in many practical scenarios involving
computing clusters, where the computing servers are con-
nected with high-speed communication links, while the links
between the source nodes and the servers, and between the user
and the servers may have limited bandwidth. However, when
the inter-server communication costs (delay, bandwidth and/or
energy) are non-negligible, the extra rounds of communication
among the servers, required for various share conversions,
become prohibitive.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we developed a novel polynomial coded
computation scheme achieving a near-optimal performance
in terms of the upload cost for SDMM across N servers,
any T of which may collude. We also proposed a scheme
achieving the optimal upload cost for the special case when
the user requesting the computation is also the source of
the matrices to be computed upon. The scheme involves
evaluating the constructed polynomials at the roots of unity
in an appropriate finite field, which is equivalent to taking
the discrete Fourier transform of the constituent matrices.
The encoding and decoding complexity is also lower than
all the other schemes in the literature. For a special case
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of the data matrices having certain asymptotic dimensions,
our scheme also achieves the optimal download cost. We also
introduced a method for straggler mitigation, which provides
group-wise tolerance to straggling servers. Straggler tolerance
is achieved at the expense of an increase in the upload cost.
We further extended our scheme to implement multiplication
of multiple matrices, while keeping the input matrices and all
the intermediate computations secure against any T colluding
servers, with a minimal upload cost. This presents a substantial
improvement in performance in terms of the upload cost for
multiplication of multiple matrices over existing schemes in
the literature. Moreover, we described procedures for other
common matrix operations, some of which can be reduced to
a set of matrix multiplications, thus allowing us to compute
arbitrary matrix polynomials.
For future work, methods for securely performing other
matrix operations, such as matrix decompositions, on dis-
tributed servers will be explored. It would also be interesting
to develop schemes for multiplication of arbitrary number
of matrices with minimum inter-server communication. From
a more practical perspective, an interesting problem to look
at is the simultaneous scheduling of the computation and
communication phases to minimize the overall latency.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Rane, W. Sun, and A. Vetro, “Secure function evaluation based on
secret sharing and homomorphic encryption,” in Annual Allerton Conf.
on Comm., Control, and Computing, Sep. 2009, pp. 827–834.
[2] M. Yasuda, T. Shimoyama, J. Kogure, K. Yokoyama, and T. Koshiba,
“Secure statistical analysis using rlwe-based homomorphic encryption,”
in Information Security and Privacy, E. Foo and D. Stebila, Eds. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2015, pp. 471–487.
[3] D. H. Duong, P. K. Mishra, and M. Yasuda, “Efficient secure
matrix multiplication over lwe-based homomorphic encryption,” Tatra
Mountains Mathematical Publications, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 69 – 83, 2016.
[Online]. Available: https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/tmmp/67/
1/article-p69.xml
[4] M. Yasuda, T. Shimoyama, J. Kogure, K. Yokoyama, and T. Koshiba,
“Practical packing method in somewhat homomorphic encryption,”
in Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 34–50.
[5] N. J. Bouman and N. de Vreede, “New protocols for secure linear
algebra: Pivoting-free elimination and fast block-recursive matrix de-
composition,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2018, p. 703, 2018.
[6] R. Cramer and I. Damgård, “Secure distributed linear algebra in a
constant number of rounds,” in Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO
2001, J. Kilian, Ed. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2001, pp. 119–136.
[7] K. Lee, M. Lam, R. Pedarsani, D. Papailiopoulos, and K. Ramchandran,
“Speeding up distributed machine learning using codes,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1514–1529, March
2018.
[8] R. Tandon, Q. Lei, A. G. Dimakis, and N. Karampatziakis, “Gradient
coding: Avoiding stragglers in distributed learning,” in Proceedings
of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning, ser.
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, D. Precup and Y. W. Teh,
Eds., vol. 70. International Convention Centre, Sydney, Australia:
PMLR, 06–11 Aug 2017, pp. 3368–3376. [Online]. Available:
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v70/tandon17a.html
[9] Q. Yu, M. Maddah-Ali, and S. Avestimehr, “Polynomial codes: an
optimal design for high-dimensional coded matrix multiplication,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, I. Guyon,
U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan,
and R. Garnett, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc., 2017, pp. 4403–4413.
[10] S. Dutta, M. Fahim, F. Haddadpour, H. Jeong, V. Cadambe, and
P. Grover, “On the optimal recovery threshold of coded matrix mul-
tiplication,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 66, no. 1,
pp. 278–301, Jan 2020.
[11] S. Dutta, Z. Bai, H. Jeong, T. M. Low, and P. Grover, “A unified coded
deep neural network training strategy based on generalized polydot
codes,” 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT), pp. 1585–1589, 2018.
[12] Q. Yu, M. A. Maddah-Ali, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Straggler mitigation
in distributed matrix multiplication: Fundamental limits and optimal
coding,” in 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
(ISIT), June 2018, pp. 2022–2026.
[13] Q. Yu, N. Raviv, J. So, and A. S. Avestimehr, “Lagrange
coded computing: Optimal design for resiliency, security and
privacy,” CoRR, vol. abs/1806.00939, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1806.00939
[14] I. S. Reed and G. Solomon, “Polynomial codes over certain
finite fields,” Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 300–304, 1960. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1137/0108018
[15] B. Hasircioglu, J. Gomez-Vilardebo, and D. Gunduz, “Bivariate polyno-
mial coding for exploiting stragglers in heterogeneous coded computing
systems,” 2020.
[16] W.-T. Chang and R. Tandon, “On the capacity of secure distributed
matrix multiplication,” arXiv e-prints, Jun. 2018.
[17] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Commun. ACM, vol. 22, no. 11,
pp. 612–613, Nov. 1979. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/359168.359176
[18] R. D’Oliveira, S. El Rouayheb, and D. Karpuk, “GASP codes for secure
distributed matrix multiplication,” arXiv e-prints, Dec. 2018.
[19] Z. Jia and S. A. Jafar, “On the Capacity of Secure Distributed Matrix
Multiplication,” arXiv e-prints, Aug. 2019.
[20] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus, “Multi-message private information re-
trieval: Capacity results and near-optimal schemes,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 64, no. 10, pp. 6842–6862, Oct 2018.
[21] R. Tajeddine, O. W. Gnilke, D. Karpuk, R. Freij-Hollanti, and C. Hol-
lanti, “Private information retrieval from coded storage systems with
colluding, Byzantine, and unresponsive servers,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 3898–3906, June 2019.
[22] M. Aliasgari, O. Simeone, and J. Kliewer, “Distributed and private coded
matrix computation with flexible communication load,” in 2019 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), July 2019, pp.
1092–1096.
[23] S. Dutta, M. Fahim, F. Haddadpour, H. Jeong, V. Cadambe, and
P. Grover, “On the optimal recovery threshold of coded matrix mul-
tiplication,” arXiv e-prints, Jan. 2018.
[24] J. Kakar, A. Khristoforov, S. Ebadifar, and A. Sezgin, “Uplink-
downlink tradeoff in secure distributed matrix multiplication,” ArXiv,
vol. abs/1910.13849, 2019.
[25] H. A. Nodehi and M. A. Maddah-Ali, “Limited-sharing multi-party
computation for massive matrix operations,” in 2018 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), June 2018, pp. 1231–1235.
[26] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, Completeness Theorems
for Non-Cryptographic Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computation. New
York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2019,
p. 351âA˘S¸371. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3335741.
3335756
[27] S. Lin, T. Y. Al-Naffouri, Y. S. Han, and W. Chung, “Novel polynomial
basis with fast Fourier transform and its application to Reed-Solomon
erasure codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 62,
no. 11, pp. 6284–6299, 2016.
[28] J. Kakar, S. Ebadifar, and A. Sezgin, “Rate-efficiency and straggler-
robustness through partition in distributed two-sided secure matrix
computation,” ArXiv, vol. abs/1810.13006, 2018.
[29] A. Borodin and R. Moenck, “Fast modular transforms,” Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 366 – 386,
1974. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0022000074800292
[30] M. Ylinen, A. Burian, and J. Takala, “Direct versus iterative methods
for fixed-point implementation of matrix inversion,” in IEEE Int’l
Symposium on Circuits and Systems, vol. 3, 2004, pp. III–225.
